The Southern Countryside at War: Context

The war in southern Vietnam between the National Liberation Front, or better known to Americans as the Viet Cong, and the combined forces of the United States Military and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was a moment in history that stressed the resilience and determination of the Communist forces. It also highlighted the extreme destruction that would take place in the rural countryside in the south, as Ngo Van Long put it, “Not since the Romans salted the land after destroying Carthage has a nation taken such pains to visit the war on later generations.”[1] Historians have debated for many years the exact reasons why and how the Communist were able to succeed in Vietnam, but as one does the research, it reveals that there were a variety of reasons that led to the NLF’s ultimate victory; reasons that varied not only on the Communist side but on the American and South Vietnam’s as well.
The war that consumed the southern countryside was made possible by the ability of the NLF to influence and take control of the smaller provinces and villages throughout the south. The administrations from Kennedy through Nixon claimed that the NLF used means of terrorism to influence policies at the village level. Many historians have examined some of the statistics of terrorist tactics used in villages, and in the years following the war many came to the conclusion that terrorism was a last resort and only used in rare cases. But after later examination in the decades following the war, many came to the realization that terrorism was used quite extensively and effectively. What the NLF also did was create institutions that stressed their overall ideological views, in other words, they promoted reeducation and the idea of revolutionary warfare.[2] The idea of revolutionary warfare implemented by the NLF:
“seeks complete political change followed by a social revolution. The goal of revolutionary warfare is to destroy the credibility of the established order, construct a counter ideology and counter institutions (infrastructure) with a view to overthrowing the existing order as the first step to overall social change.”[3]
Terrorism was highly effective at the village level. The NLF outlined a list of people in the village who might have posed a threat to their influence and structure.[4] The list targeted such people as officials of the South Vietnamese Government who oversaw the villages, others determined to be tyrants in the eyes of villagers and the NLF and others termed “reactionaries” or people involved with religion.[5] The NLF used the element of terrorism to stabilize certain areas when they first took control, establishing their dominance and ideological views. The NLF also used terror as a means of sometimes gaining the respect and gratitude of villagers in the south by disposing of unpopular and hated officials. By using the tactic of assassinating government officials they bound themselves to the villagers and also made an example of anyone else who opposed. “Such tactics not only eliminated members of the opposition and served as a warning to other GVN personnel, but they might gain popular support of the NLF.”[6]
The important use of terrorism and ideological reeducation were not the only factors that helped contribute to the victory of the Communists in the south. A very big reason as to why the Communists were able to succeed was the inability of the American military and government to grasp the nature of the problem growing in the provinces and elsewhere. Many scholars agree that the Americans and South Vietnamese Government misunderstood just how determined the Communists in the South were towards achieving their goal:
“From the outset, moreover, it faced a disciplined and determined adversary, with an ideology adapted to Vietnamese political culture, skilled in the methods of revolutionary warfare perfected in the ten year struggle with France, and fanatically committed to its goals.”[7]
American personnel in Vietnam at the time of the escalation of the war in 1965 also had to come to terms with the fact that they lacked an understanding of “the conditions and nature of the conflict”.[8] Jeffrey Race explains that even though he was a military advisor he lacked an understanding of the conflict and he “frequently had to make decisions affecting people’s lives.”[9] This divergence between Vietnamese culture and the west helped to cause a divide and at this point it was only natural that the ideas of the NLF would appeal to the masses. Race explains that, “the revolutionary movement did not need to be good or effective by any absolute standard; it needed only to be better than the government.”[10] This shows clearly that the Western powers who supported the South Vietnamese government helped to influence the belief held by many common villagers that viewed the government in the south as a puppet to the west and lacking an understanding of the village and provincial lifestyle and naturally the NLF was viewed at this period as being seen as the torchbearer for the poor farmers in the villages.
What is most important to in viewing the insurgency in the south is to remember that the ideas of rebellion and revolution had been stewing in the southern countryside for many years. The south was a constant threat to the status quo in the sense that it was the launching ground for many rebellions against authority.What the south contributed to these revolutions from the 1930s and onward was a constant safe haven from government officials. Despite constant bombings and firefights, the revolution was able to survive because of these villages in the south, they contributed to the defense and the protection of NLF members.
Also one of the key elements that affected the southern countryside and Vietnam as a whole during the war was the rampant use of defoliants in the jungles. The use of these chemicals wrought havoc upon the southern countryside and affected the lives of many villagers for years. The United States’ strategy of a war of attrition, which involved the use of defoliants and napalming villages, was a primarily used to drive villagers away from the countryside and into the city, thus weakening the power structure of the NLF or Viet Cong, a strategy entitled “forced-draft urbanization” by Professor Samuel Huntington.[11]What occurred in the villages as the US implemented its bombing campaign across the countryside was nothing short of a tragedy:
“Much of Vietnam was turned into free fire zones, into which hurtled immense tonnages of explosives and herbicides (defoliants such as Agent Orange)…This involved truly massive rural area bombing, chemical and mechanical forest destruction, large scale crop destruction, destruction of food stores, the destruction of hospitals and large scale population displacements…”[12]
In the years following the end of the war, specifically the 1980s, the Southern part of Vietnam was still feeling the affects of the bombing policies of the United State. It was reported that in the years following the war the Vietnamese went to the remaining forests to help rebuild schools, hospitals and other buildings destroyed during the war. Because of the destruction of forests during the war and the over use of wood after the war to rebuild, many forests virtually disappeared in Vietnam after the war.[13]
The Southern Countryside in the Vietnam War played a key role in the victory of the Communists. Although many historians disagree as to just how they achieved this victory, they all still agree that the NLF and the Communists prevailed. Through the implementation of terrorism and ideological reeducation they helped control the southern villages and because of the deep miscalculations and misunderstandings of the American military and South Vietnamese government it helped contribute to the overall cause of the revolutionaries. But the victory came at an ultimate price, the destruction of wildlife, villages, forests and rice paddies led to long term effects that many Vietnamese felt personally right at the close of the war. The use of defoliants also led to a biological emergency in which many who fought and lived in Southern Vietnam, including American soldiers, were suddenly being ravaged by cancerous outbreaks.
The reasons that helped contribute to the victories of the Communists vary from person to person, but the biggest factor seems to be the ability of the isolated villages to hide and protect the revolutionaries at the risk of their own lives and at an ultimate price in the end. If the ideas and revolutionaries survive, the war will continue and thus victory may be assured.


[1] Tully, John. Vietnam: War and the Environment. Green Left. July 14, 1993.
http://www.greenleft.org.au/1993/106/5903

[2] Schultz, Richard. Autumn 1978. The Limits of Terrorism in Insurgency Warfare: The Case of the Viet Cong. Polity 11(1) : pg 83
[3] Schultz, The Limits of Terrorism, pg 74
[4] Ibid, pg 83
[5] Ibid, pg 83-84
[6] Ibid, pg 85
[7] Herring, George C. April 1982. American Strategy in Vietnam: The Postwar Debate. Military Affairs, 46(2). Pg 61
[8] Race, Jeffrey. 1972. The War Comes to Long An. (University of California Press) pg ix
[9] Race, The War Comes to Long An, pg ix
[10] Ibid, pg xv
[11] Tully, John. Vietnam: War and the Environment
[12] Ibid
[13] Ibid