Army of the Republic of Vietnam: Text

Text

Brigham, Robert K. (2006). ARVN: Life and Death In the South Vietnamese Army.
Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

Mr. Brigham offers insight to what life was like for an ARVN soldier. Mr. Brigham covers ARVN topics such as conscription, training, morale, battles, and families. These areas covered by Mr. Brigham involve an ARVN theater outside of the battlefield. Subjects in particular Mr. Brigham seems to have the most interest in are the areas of family/conscription and how they relate to ARVN life. Mr. Brigham argues that the ARVN were one of the most maligned armed forces in history. This notion of the ARVN being maligned is claimed to be a myth by Mr. Brigham. Mr. Brigham states to have an strong interest in sociomilitary history. The ARVN were essentially a part of society because of the large amount of men it took from society through the draft. The ARVN is generally looked upon as one of the most maligned forces to ever take the field of combat. It is not the ARNV's fault as to why they were generally an underachieving/ineffective low-level army. Beginning with their start as the VNA (1949-1955) to the end of the Vietnam War (1955-1975), the ARVN was mismanaged. A strong factor as to why the ARVN is largely considered a once maligned army was the quality of training they received.

Conscription

The years between 1955 and 1960 most ARVN troops volunteered for military service. In the U.S. the military draft has its own history. Historically in Vietnam, if their was such a draft, it was suited to fit Vietnam's culture and people in the best possible way. Conscription, when enacted by the U.S. government in Southern Vietnam, required loads of able bodied men to serve in the ARVN. The government in Saigon, along with the U.S. government, ignored Vietnam's past philosophy of instituting the draft during wartime. President Diem in Southern Vietnam realized that the way in which the United States wanted to build an army would be wrong, but he faced a crossroads. Diem could have done it his way, but he faced the possibility of losing financial support/stability from the United States government. Diem's realizations, coupled with his actions, were looked upon as threatening and he was assassinated. The average ARVN recruit was from the countryside and he was generally a peasant; the poor man was force to fight. The draft took away the countryside's ability to produce for Southern Vietnam, which in turn zapped the economy of its strength. The U.S. and Saigon government put into place a heavy military draft, therefore desertions in the ARVN became a reality. Biased deferments of the draft were a result of corruption in a mismanaged ARVN. Despite the large numbers of Vietnamese men drafted, the Saigon and U.S. governments never got the full amount of men they expected to be in the ARVN, but the ARVN was a large force.

Training

The quality of an armed force's training is arguably the most important factor in determining its success. The instructor cadre assigned to train the ARVN were not experienced combat veterans. Consisting of American advisers who were generally young lieutenants fresh from military school, inept military sucklings, or American soldiers who did not care; the training cadre did not fulfill its job of properly training the ARVN and it showed in times of combat. The draftee process induction centers that ARVN recruits were sent to were mixed with confusion over who went where and ARVN recruits ended up waiting and waiting for orders that seemed to never come. Physical examinations determining draft deferments were corrupt and biased. The basic training program was only five to six weeks long which was far too short to turn a man into a soldier. The Saigon government came up with combined operations involving the ARVN operating with U.S. forces, but this did not curtail all the problems that needed to be fixed. Political training took precedence over military training which was a grave mistake. Many ARVN soldiers believed that political training should be separate from military training. Soldiers should know what they are fighting for before they even go to a training center. A soldier cannot train effectively enough if his mind is concentrating on why he is there in the first place. Concentration on his training alone is essential for a soldier's success in combat. If the U.S. government would have invested heavily in training the ARVN properly, the ARVN's chances of success would have been greater. The amount of soldiers needed in the ARVN could have been reduced if the training would have been better. More Vietnamese men could have stayed at home with their families. An army of 100,000 men well trained is far more effective than 300,000 men who are not well trained. The ARVN (as a whole) deserved better training than what they got.

Morale

Success of the PAVN against the French occupation of Vietnam was a huge event in 1954. Whether one was a pure nationalist or a pure communist in Vietnam(1954), victory over foreign powers meant independence for Vietnam as a country. ARVN troops felt this and it made them feel left out. ARVN soldiers were fighting for a government(s) that wanted Vietnam split in half if necessary. Desertions played a vital part in morale. Inadequate pay, food, housing, and medical care played a role in low morale. Annual leave of duty (commonly called R and R for Rest and Relaxation) was greatly restrained as the war dragged on. The PAVN had morale problems, but it did not not face the same desertion problems. The Communist Party adopted Marxist, Maoist and Leninist ideals that dealt with locals and their situations. Local support was vital, which was something the ARVN generally did not have. The opposition forces of the ARVN lived off the land and were not succumbed to life on a military base. The ARVN, more so from 1965 to 1969 while the U.S. Army was fully engaged against the PAVN and the PLAF, lived on military bases and experienced long periods of boredom. This led to morale sinking lower.

Battles

In the chaotic realm of a battlefield one must have strong nerves and the ability to let his training take over his instinctive reactions to violence. The reality is to kill or be killed in a military battle. War is hell. The ARVN were not very effective in the first battles it saw action. As evidenced in the battle of AP BAC (1963) the ARVN, with their poor training mixed with the U.S. assumption that superior firepower would destroy the opposition rather easily, found out that fighting with advanced weaponry meant little in the terrain of Vietnam. Low lying marshes, dense jungle, and even mountainous areas made up a good portion of the countryside. The PAVN and the PLAF used the terrain in Vietnam to their full advantage and even though they were outnumbered, the PAVN and the PLAF fought of ARVN attacks with mostly guerrilla tactics and a little bit of ingenuity. This rendered the conventional military tactics employed by the United States government, which was bestowed onto the ARVN as the "right way to fight this war", as obsolete. The PAVN and PLAF, throughout the war, employed a "poke and hide, hide and poke" strategy of warfare. Thinking that little or no success in battle was primarily the ARVN's fault, the United States government employed this "right" way to fight with its own army (1963-1970) and this strategy again failed.

Families

Soldiers must fight as a team within a unit to have the greatest possible chance of success. The ARVN fought and died for their families. A significant part of Vietnamese culture is family. Their lack of sufficient training coupled with their mismanagement from the start, caused individualism to exist withing the ARVN. No one can really blame the ARVN for this. Having been taken from their families because of the draft, the regular ARVN soldier felt lost in a foreign military created from the philosophy of a foreign power. This foreign power (U.S.) made no attempts to take Vietnam's culture into consideration. ARVN soldiers did what they could to keep their families safe in a war torn country. A large number of ARVN soldiers brought along families, or their families followed them, to the base camps to which they were assigned. Small tightly-nit base camp communities came about as a result. ARVN soldiers fought along side each other, but when it came down to it, their families were the shelter ARVN soldiers could rely on. Soldiers have to rely on one another to be successful in combat. The Saigon government made efforts to try and convince the wives of soldiers that the best way they were contributing to the war effort was to support their husbands. In reality, families followed their soldiers to camp not only because of love, but because ARVN life was harsh for the soldier and the countryside was growing unsafe. ARVN soldiers created their own culture that emphasized family ties and individual strength. The defeat of South Vietnam by North Vietnam communists, led some ARVN families to leave Vietnam for the United States to start over. Not all ARVN families made it to the U.S. The ones who stayed in Vietnam tried to avoid humiliation in the face of the communists. ARVN soldiers, and primarily ARVN officers, served time in reeducation camps after the war.

If the Army of the Republic of Vietnam would have been trained in the best possible way, would the ARVN have won the Vietnam War (1955-1975)? Maybe yes and maybe no. The amount of men who died in the ARVN would not have been as high during the Vietnam War. They would have been better fighters. They would have had a better spirit as soldiers. They would have had more of an identity of themselves. Good training builds camaraderie between soldiers. There is an old saying, "the more you bleed in training, the less you bleed on the battlefield." Teamwork and a good work ethic is essential to have the greatest possibility of success as an army. The ARVN had the men, the weapons and the materials, but because of the ARVN's mismanagement by the U.S. government, they lacked good quality training.